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The security of public key validation protocols for web-based applications has
recently attracted attention because of weaknesses in the certicate authority
model, and consequent attacks.
Recent proposals using public logs have succeeded in making certicate
management more transparent and veriable. However, those proposals involve a
xed set of authorities. This means an oligopoly is created. Another problem with
current log-based system is their heavy reliance on trusted parties that monitor
the logs.
We propose a distributed transparent key infrastructure (DTKI), which greatly
reduces the oligopoly of service providers and allows verication of the behaviour
of trusted parties. In addition, this paper formalises the public log data structure
and provides a formal analysis of the security that DTKI guarantees.
Keywords: PKI; SSL; TLS; key distribution; certicate; transparency; trust; formal
verication
1. INTRODUCTION
The security of web-based applications such as e-
commerce and web-mail depends on the ability of a
user's browser to obtain authentic copies of the public
keys for the application website. For example, suppose
a user wishes to log in to her bank account through
her web browser. The web session will be secured by
the public key of the bank. If the user's web browser
accepts an inauthentic public key for the bank, then the
trac (including log-in credentials) can be intercepted
and manipulated by an attacker.
The authenticity of keys is assured at present by
certicate authorities (CAs). In the given example, the
browser is presented with a public key certicate for
the bank, which is intended to be unforgeable evidence
that the given public key is the correct one for the bank.
The certicate is digitally signed by a CA. The user's
browser is pre-congured to accept certicates from
certain known CAs. A typical installation of Firefox
has about 100 root certicates in its database.
Unfortunately, numerous problems with the current
CA model have been identied. Firstly, CAs must
be assumed to be trustworthy. If a CA is dishonest
or compromised, it may issue certicates asserting the
authenticity of fake keys; those keys could be created
by an attacker or by the CA itself. Secondly, the
assumption of honesty does not scale up very well. As
already mentioned, a browser typically has hundreds of
CAs registered in it, and the user cannot be expected to
have evaluated the trustworthiness and security of all of
them. This fact has been exploited by attackers [1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6]. In 2011, two CAs were compromised: Comodo
[7] and DigiNotar [8]. In both cases, certicates for
high-prole sites were illegitimately obtained, and in
the second case, reportedly used in a man in the middle
(MITM) attack [9].
Proposed solutions
Several interesting solutions have been proposed to
address these problems. For a comprehensive survey,
see [10].
Key pinning mitigates the problem of untrustworthy
CAs, by dening in the client browser the parameters
concerning the set of CAs that are considered entitled
to certify the key for a given domain [11, 12]. However,
scalability is a challenge for key pinning.
Crowd-sourcing techniques have been proposed in
order to detect untrustworthy CAs, by enabling a
browser to obtain warnings if the received certicates
are dierent from those that other people are being
oered [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Crowd-sourcing
techniques have solved some CA-based problems.
However, the technique cannot distinguish between
attacks and authentic certicate updates, and may also
suer from an initial unavailability period.
Solutions for revocation management of certicates
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have also been proposed; they mostly involve period-
ically pushing revocation lists to browsers, in order
to remove the need for on-the-y revocation checking
[21, 22]. However, these solutions create a window dur-
ing which the browser's revocation lists are out of date
until the next push.
More recently, solutions involving public append-only
logs have been proposed. We consider the leading
proposals here.
Public log-based systems Sovereign Keys (SK)
[23] aims to get rid of browser certicate warnings,
by allowing domain owners to establish a long term
(\sovereign") key and by providing a mechanism by
which a browser can hard-fail if it doesn't succeed in
establishing security via that key. The sovereign key is
used to cross-sign operational TLS [24, 25] keys, and it
is stored in an append-only log on a \time-line server",
which is abundantly mirrored. However, in SK, internet
users and domain owners have to trust mirrors of time-
line servers, as SK does not enable mirrors to provide
ecient veriable proofs that the received certicate is
indeed included in the append-only log.
Certicate transparency (CT) [26] is a technique
proposed by Google that aims to eciently detect fake
public key certicates issued by corrupted certicate
authorities, by making certicate issuance transparent.
They improved the idea of SK by using append-only
Merkle tree to organise the append-only log. This
enables the log maintainer to provide two types of
veriable cryptographic proofs: (a) a proof that the
log contains a given certicate, and (b) a proof that a
snapshot of the log is an extension of another snapshot
(i.e., only appends have taken place between the two
snapshots). The time and size for proof generation and
verication are logarithmic in the number of certicates
recorded in the log. Domain owners can obtain the
proof that their certicates are recorded in the log,
and provide the proof together with the certicate to
their clients, so the clients can get a guarantee that the
received certicate is recorded in the log.
Accountable key infrastructure (AKI) [27] also uses
public logs to make certicate management more
transparent. By using a data structure that is based
on lexicographic ordering rather than chronological
ordering, they solve the problem of key revocations
in the log. In addition, AKI uses the \checks-and-
balances" idea that allows parties to monitor each
other's misbehaviour. So AKI limits the requirement
to trust any party. Moreover, AKI prevents attacks
that use fake certicates rather than merely detecting
such attacks (as in CT). However, as a result, AKI
needs a strong assumption | namely, CAs, public log
maintainers, and validators do not collude together |
and heavily relies on third parties called validators to
ensure that the log is maintained without improper
modications.
Certicate issuance and revocation transparency
(CIRT) [28] is a proposal for managing certicates for
end-to-end encrypted email. It proposes an idea to
address the revocation problem left open by CT, and
the trusted party problem of AKI. It collects ideas
from both CT and AKI to provide transparent key
revocation, and reduces reliance on trusted parties
by designing the monitoring role so that it can be
distributed among user browsers. However, CIRT can
only detect attacks that use fake certicates; it cannot
prevent them. In addition, since CIRT was proposed for
email applications, it does not support the multiplicity
of log maintainers that would be required for web
certicates.
Attack Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure (ARPKI)
[29] is an improvement on AKI. In ARPKI, a client
can designate n service providers (e.g. CAs and
log maintainers), and only needs to contact one CA
to register her certicate. Each of the designated
service providers will monitor the behaviour of other
designated service providers. As a result, ARPKI
prevents attacks even when n  1 service providers are
colluding together, whereas in AKI, an adversary who
successfully compromises two out of three designated
service providers can successfully launch attacks [29]. In
addition, the security property of ARPKI is proved by
using a protocol verication tool called Tamarin prover
[30]. The weakness of ARPKI is that all n designated
service providers have to be involved in all the processes
(i.e. certicate registration, conrmation, and update),
which would cause considerable extra latencies and the
delay of client connections.
In public log-based systems, eorts have been made
to integrate revocation management with the certicate
auditing. CT introduced revocation transparency (RT)
[31] to deal with certicate revocation management; and
in AKI and ARPKI, the public log only stores currently
valid certicates (revoked certicates are purged from
the log). However, the revocation checking processes
in both RT and A(RP)KI are linear in the number of
issued certicates making it inecient. CIRT allows
ecient proofs of non-revocation, but it does not scale
to multiple logs which are required for web certicates.
Remaining problems
A foundational issue is the problem of oligopoly. The
present-day certicate authority model requires that the
set of global certicate authorities is xed and known
to every browser, which implies an oligopoly. Currently,
the majority of CAs in browsers are organisations based
in the USA, and it is hard to become a browser-accepted
CA because of the strong trust assumption that it
implies. This means that a Russian bank operating in
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Russia and serving Russian citizens living in Russia has
to use an American CA for their public key. This cannot
be considered satisfactory in the presence of mutual
distrust between nations regarding cybersecurity and
citizen surveillance, and also trade sanctions which may
prevent the USA oering services (such as CA services)
to certain other countries.
None of the previously discussed public log-based
systems address this issue. In each of those solutions,
the set of log maintainers (and where applicable, time-
line servers, validators, etc.) is assumed to be known
by the browsers, and this puts a high threshold on the
requirements to become a log maintainer (or validator,
etc.). Moreover, none of them solve the problem that a
multiplicity of log maintainers reduces the usefulness of
transparency, since a domain owner has to check each
log maintainer to see if it has mis-issued certicates.
This can't work if there is a large number of log
maintainers operating in dierent geographical regions,
each one of which has to be checked by every domain
owner.
A second issue is the requirement of trusted parties.
Currently, all existing proposals have to rely on some
sort of trusted parties or at least assume that not
all parties are colluding together. However, a strong
adversary (e.g. a government agency) might be able to
control all service providers (used by a given client) in
a system.
A third foundational issue of a dierent nature is that
of analysis and correctness. SK, CT, AKI and CIRT
are large and complex protocols involving sophisticated
data structures, but none of them have been subjected
to rigorous analysis. It is well-known that security
protocols are notoriously dicult to get right, and the
only way to avoid this is with systematic verication.
For example, attacks on AKI and CIRT have been
identied in [29] and in the appendix of our technical
report [32], respectively. The aws may be easily xed,
but only once they have been identied. It is therefore
imperative to verify this kind of complex protocol.
ARPKI is the rst formally veried log-based PKI
system. However, they used several abstractions during
modelling in the Tamarin prover. For example, they
represent the underlying log structure (a Merkle tree)
as a list. However, in systems like CIRT and this paper
with more complex data structures, it is important to
have a formalised data structure and its properties to
prove the security claim. The formalisation of complex
data structures and their properties in the log-based
PKI systems is a remaining problem.
The last problem is the management of certicate
revocation. As explained previously, existing solutions
for managing certicate revocation (e.g. CRL, OCSP,
RT) are still unsatisfactory.
This paper
We propose a new public log-based architecture
for managing web certicates, called Distributed
Transparent Key Infrastructure (DTKI), with the
following contributions.
 We identify anti-oligopoly as an important prop-
erty for web certicate management which has
hitherto not received attention.
 Compared to its predecessors, DTKI is the rst
system to have all desired features | it minimises
the presence of oligopoly, prevents attacks that
use fake certicates, provides a way to manage
certicate revocation, veries output from trusted
parties, and is secure even if all service providers
(e.g. CAs and log maintainers) collude together
(see Section 5 for our security statement). A
comparison of the properties of dierent log-based
systems can be found in Section 6.
 We provide formal machine-checked verication of
its core security property using the Tamarin prover.
In addition, we formalise the data structures
needed for transparent public logs, and provide
rigorous proofs of their properties.
2. OVERVIEW OF DTKI
Distributed Transparent Key Infrastructure (DTKI) is
an infrastructure for managing keys and certicates
on the web in a way which is transparent, minimises
oligopoly, and allows verication of the behaviour of
trusted parties. In DTKI, we mainly have the following
agents:
Certicate log maintainers (CLM): A CLM main-
tains a database of all valid and invalid (e.g. expired or
revoked) certicates for a particular set of domains for
which it is responsible. It commits to digests of its log,
and provides ecient proofs of presence and absence of
certicates in the log. CLMs behave transparently and
their actions can be veried.
A mapping log maintainer (MLM): To minimise
oligopoly, DTKI does not x the set of certicate logs.
The MLM maintains association between certicate
logs and the domains they are responsible for. It also
commits to digests of the log, and provides ecient
proof of current association, and behaves transparently.
Clients of the MLM are not required to blindly trust the
MLM, because they can eciently verify the obtained
associations.
The MLM has a strategic role of determining
the authorised CLMs, and the mapping log to be
maintained rarely changes; therefore it can be easily
governed by an international panel. In practice, ICANN
is a possible party to be given the responsibility to run
the MLM.
Users and their browsers: They query the MLM, and
obtain and verify the proofs about the mapping of top-
level domains (TLDs) to CLMs. They query CLMs and
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obtain and verify proofs about certicates.
Mirrors: Mirrors are servers that maintain a full
copy of the mapping log and certicate logs respectively
downloaded from the MLM and corresponding CLMs,
and the corresponding digest of the log signed by the
log maintainer. In other words, mirrors are distributed
copies of logs. Anyone (e.g. ISPs, CLMs, CAs, domain
owners) can be a mirror. Unlike in SK, mirrors are
not required to be trusted in DTKI, because they give
a proof for every association that they send to their
clients. The proof is associated to the digest of the
MLM.
Certicate authorities (CA): They check the identity
of domain owners, and create certicates for the domain
owners' keys. However, in contrast with today's CAs,
the ability of CAs in DTKI is limited since the issuance
of a certicate from a CA is not enough to convince web
browsers to accept the certicate (proof of presence in
the relevant CLM is also needed).
In DTKI, each domain owner has two types
of certicate, namely TLS certicate and master
certicate. Domain owners can have dierent TLS
certicates but can only have one master certicate.
A TLS certicate contains the public key of a
domain server for a TLS connection, whereas the
master certicate contains a public key, called \master
verication key". The corresponding secret key of
the master certicate is called \master signing key".
Similar to the \sovereign key" in SK [23], the master
signing key is only used to validate a TLS certicate
(of the same subject) by issuing a signature on it. This
limits the ability of certicate authorities since without
having a valid signature (issued by using the master
signing key), the TLS certicate will not be accepted.
Hence, the TLS secret key is the one for daily use; and
the master signing key is rarely used. It will only be
used for validating a new certicate, or revoking an
existing certicate. We assume that domain owners can
take care of their master signing key, as a master signing
key can be kept oine, and is rarely used.
After a domain owner obtains a master certicate
or a TLS certicate from a CA, he needs to make
a registration request to the corresponding CLM to
publish the certicate into the log. To do so, the
domain owner signs the certicate using the master
signing key, and submits the signed certicate to a CLM
determined (typically based on the top-level domain) by
the MLM. The CLM checks the signature, and accepts
the certicate by adding it to the certicate log if the
signature is valid. The process of revoking a certicate
is handled similarly to the process of registering a
certicate in the log.
When establishing a secure connection with a domain
server, the browser receives a corresponding certicate
and proofs from a mirror of the MLM and a CLM, and
veries the certicate, the proof that the certicate is
valid and recorded in the certicate log, and proof that
this certicate log is authorised to manage certicates
for the domain. Users and their browsers should only
accept a certicate if the certicate is issued by a CA,
and validated by the domain owner, and current in the
certicate log.
Fake master certicates or TLS certicates can be
easily detected by the domain owner, because the
attacker will have had to insert such fake certicates
into the log (in order to be accepted by browsers), and
is thus visible to the domain owner.
Rather than relying solely on trusted monitors to
verify the healthiness of logs and the relations between
logs, DTKI uses a crowdsourcing-like way to ensure the
integrity of the log and the relations between mapping
log and a certicate log, and between certicate logs. In
particular, the monitoring work in DTKI can be broken
into independent little pieces, and thus can be done by
distributing the pieces to users' browsers. In this way,
users' browsers can perform randomly-chosen pieces of
the monitoring role in the background (e.g. once a day).
Thus, web users can collectively monitor the integrity of
the logs. We envisage parameters in browsers allowing
users to control how that works.
To avoid the case that attackers create a \bubble"
(i.e. an isolated environment) around a victim, we share
the same assumption as other existing protocols (e.g.
CT and CIRT) { we assume that gossip protocols [33]
are used to disseminate digests of the log. So, users
of logs can detect if a log maintainer shows dierent
versions of the log to dierent sets of users. Since log
maintainers sign and time-stamp their digests, a log
maintainer that issues inconsistent digests can be held
accountable.
3. THE PUBLIC LOG
DTKI uses append-only logs to record all requests
processed by the log maintainer, and allows log
maintainers to eciently generate some proofs that can
be eciently veried. These proofs mainly include that
some data (e.g. a certicate or a revocation request)
has or has not been added to the log; and that a log is
extended from a previous version.
So, the log maintainer's behaviour is transparent to
the public, and the public is not required to blindly trust
log maintainers. Public log data structures have been
widely studied [34, 35, 36, 37, 23, 26, 28]. To the best
of our knowledge, no single data structure can provide
all proofs required by DTKI. We adopt and extend the
idea of CIRT log structure [28] which makes use of two
data structures to provide all the kinds of proofs needed
for DTKI.
This section presents the intuition of two abstract
data structures encapsulating the desired properties,
then introduces how to use the data structures to
construct our public logs in a concrete manner by
extending the CIRT data structure. The formalisation
of our abstract data structures, log structures, and
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Function Output
Chronological Data Structure
digest given input a sequence S of data, it outputs
the digest of sequence S of data organised
by using chronological data structure
VerifPoPc given input (digest(S); d; p), it outputs a
boolean value indicating the verication
result of the proof p that some data d is
included in a set S
VerifPoEc given input ((dg
0; N 0); (dg;N); p), it
outputs a boolean value indicating the
verication result of the proof p that a
sequence of data represented by its digest
dg and size N is extended from another
sequence of data represented by digest dg0
and size N 0
Ordered Data Structure
digestO given input a sequence S of data, it
outputs the digest of sequence S of data
organised by using ordered data structure
VerifPoPO
(resp.
VerifPoAbsO)
given input (digesto(S); d; p), it outputs a
boolean value indicating the verication
result of the proof p that some data d is
(resp. is not) included in a set S
VerifPoAddO
(resp.
VerifPoDO)
given input (d; dg; dg0; p), it outputs a
boolean value indicating the verication
result of the proof p that dg0 is the digest
obtained after adding data d into (resp.
deleting data d from) the sequence of data
represented by digest dg
VerifPoMO given input (d; d
0; dg; dg0; p), it outputs a
boolean value indicating the verication
result of the proof p that dg0 is the digest
obtained after replacing d with d0 in the
sequence of data represented by dg
TABLE 1: Some functions supported by the data
structures, of size N . The full list of operations and
functions supported by the data structures, and the
detailed properties of the data structures, are formalised
in our technical report.
their properties, and our detailed implementation, are
presented in our technical report [32]. We also present
some examples of the data structures there.
3.1. Data structures
Our log makes use of two data structures, namely
chronological data structure and ordered data struc-
ture, to provide all the proofs required by DTKI. We
use the notion of digest to represent a unique set of
data, such that the size of a digest is a constant. For
example, a digest could be the hash value of a set of
data.
A chronological data structure is an append-only data
structure, i.e. only the operation of adding some data
is allowed. With a chronological data structure, for a
given sequence S of data of size N and with digest dg,
we have d 2 S for some data d, if and only if there
exists a proof p of size O(log(N)), called the proof of
presence of d in S, such that p can be eciently veried
by using VerifPoPc (see Table 1); and for all sequence
S0 with digest dg0 and size N 0 < N , we have that S0 is
a prex of S, if and only if there exists a proof p0 of size
O(log(N)), called the proof of extension of S from S0,
such that p0 can be eciently veried by using VerifPoEc
(see Table 1).
In this way, to verify that some data is included
in a sequence of data stored in a chronological data
structure (of sizeN), the verier only needs to download
the corresponding digest, and the corresponding proof
of presence (with size O(log(N))). The verication
of proof of extension is similarly ecient. Possible
implementations are append-only Merkle tree [34] and
append-only skip list, as proposed in [26] and [36],
respectively.
With the append-only property, the chronological
data structure enables one to prove that a version of
the data structure is an extension of a previous version.
This is useful for our public log since it enables users to
verify the history of a log maintainer's behaviours.
Unfortunately, the chronological data structure does
not provide all desired features. For example, it is very
inecient to verify that some data (e.g. a revocation
request) is not in the chronological data structure (the
cost is O(N), where N is the size of the data structure).
To provide missing features, we need to use the ordered
data structure.
An ordered data structure is a data structure allowing
one to insert, delete, and modify stored data. In
addition, with an ordered data structure, for a given
sequence S of data of size N and with digest dg, we
have d 2 S (resp. d =2 S) for some data d, if and only
if there exists a proof p of size O(log(N)), called the
proof of presence (resp. absence) of d in (resp. not
in) S, such that p can be eciently veried by using
VerifPoPO (resp. VerifPoAbsO) (see Table 1).
Possible implementations of ordered data structure
are Merkle tree which is organised as a binary
search tree (as proposed in [28]), and authenticated
dictionaries [35].
With an ordered data structure, however, the size of
proof that the current version of the data is extended
from a previous version is O(N). As the chronological
data structure and the ordered data structure have
complementary properties, we use the combination of
them to organise our log.
3.2. Mapping log
To minimise oligopoly, DTKI uses multiple certicate
logs, and does not x the set of certicate logs
and the mapping between domains and certicate
logs. A mapping log is used to record associations
between domain names and certicate log maintainers,
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and can provide ecient proofs regarding the current
association. It would be rather inecient to explicitly
associate each domain name to a certicate log, due to
the large number of domains. To eciently manage the
association, we use a class of simple regular expressions
to present a group of domain names, and record the
associations between regular expressions and certicate
logs in the mapping log. For example, the mapping
might include (*n.org, Clog1) and ([a-h].*n.com, Clog1)
to mean that certicate log maintainer Clog1 deals with
domains ending :org and domains starting with letters
from a to h ending :com. In our technical report [32], we
have formally dened some constraints on the regular
expressions we use, the relations between them, and
how to use random verication to verify that no overlap
between regular expressions exists.
Intuitively, as presented in Figure 1, the mapping log
is organised by using a chronological data structure, and
stores received requests3 together with the request time,
and four digests of dierent ordered data structures
representing the status of the log. Each entry is of the
form
h(req; t; dgs; dgbl; dgr; dgi)
In the formula, req is the request received by the
mapping log at time t; dgs4 stores information about
CLMs (e.g. the certicate of the CLM, and the current
digest of the certicate log clog); dgbl stores the identity
of blacklisted certicate log maintainers; dgr stores the
mapping from a regular expression to the identity of
CLMs, and dgi stores the mapping from the identity of
CLMs to a set of regular expressions.
In more detail, each entry of the mapping log contains
digests after processing the request req (received by
the mapping log maintainer at time t) on the digest
stored in the previous record. Each of the notations is
explained as follows:
 req can be add(rgx; id), del(rgx; id), new(cert),
mod(cert; signsk(cert
0); signsk0(n; dg; t)), bl(id),
and end, respectively corresponding to a request
to add a mapping (rgx; id) of regular expression
rgx and identity id of a clog, to delete a mapping
(rgx; id), to add a certicate cert of a new clog,
to change the certicate of a clog from cert to
cert0, to blacklist id of an existing clog, and to
close the update request; where sk and sk0 are
signing keys associated to the certicate cert and
cert0, respectively; cert and cert0 share the same
subject, and n and dg are the size and the digest
of the corresponding clog at time t, respectively;
 dgs is the digest of an ordered data structure
storing the identity information of the form
3The request includes adding, removing, and modifying a
certicate log and/or a mapping.
4We simplied the description here: we should say the ordered
data structure represented by dgs stores the information, rather
than the digest dgs stores it. We will use this simplication
through the paper.
(cert; signsk(n; dg; t)) for the currently active
certicate logs, where cert is the certicate for the
signing key sk of the certicate log, and n and dg
are respectively the size and digest of the certicate
log at time t. Data are ordered by the domain name
in cert.
 dgbl is the digest of an ordered data structure
storing the domain names of blacklisted certicate
logs. Data are ordered by the stored domain
names.
 dgr is the digest of an ordered data structure
storing elements of the form (rgx; id), which
represents the mapping from regular expression
rgx to the identity id of a clog, data are ordered
by rgx;
 dgi is the digest of an ordered data structure
storing elements of the form (id; dgirgx), which
represents the mapping from identity id of a clog
to a digest dgirgx of ordered data structure storing
a set of regular expressions, data are ordered by id.
The requests are used for modifying mappings or
the existing set of certicate log maintainers. When a
request del(rgx; id) has been processed, the maintainer
of certicate log with identity id needs to remove all
certicates whose subject is an instance of regular
expression rgx; when a request add(rgx; id) has been
processed, the maintainer of certicate log with identity
id needs to download all certicates whose subject is
an instance of rgx from the previous authorised log
maintainer, and adds them into his log. These requests
require certicate logs to synchronise with the mapping
log; see Section 3.4.
FIGURE 1: A gure representation of the format of
each record in the mapping log.
3.3. Certicate logs
The mapping log determines which certicate log is used
for a domain. The certicates for the domain are stored
in that certicate log.
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A certicate log mainly stores certicates for domains
according to the mappings presented in the mapping
log. In particular, a certicate log is also organised by
using a chronological data structure, and each entry of
the log is of the form
h(req;N; dgrgx)
where req is the received request and is processed at
the time such that the mapping log is of size N ; dgrgx
represents an ordered data structure storing a set of
mappings from regular expressions to the information
associated to the corresponding domains, such that the
domain name is an instance of the regular expression.
The stored information of a domain includes the
identity and the master certicate of the domain, and
two digests dga and dgrv each presents an ordered data
structure storing a set of active TLS certicates and a
set of expired or revoked TLS certicates, respectively.
Elements in a record (as shown in 2) of a certicate
log are detailed as follows.
 req can be reg(signsk(cert; t; `reg')),
rev(signsk(cert; t; `rev')), upadd(h(id); h), and
updel(h(id); h), corresponding to a request to reg-
ister and revoke a certicate cert at an agreed
time t such that (cert; t; `reg') or is additionally
signed by the master key sk, and update the cer-
ticate log by adding and by deleting certicates
of identity id according to the changes of mlog,
respectively. `reg' and `rev' are constant, and h is
some value and we will explain it later.
 N is the size of mlog at the time req is processed;
 dgrgx is the digest of an ordered data structure
storing a set of elements of the form (rgx; dgid),
represents the status of the certicate log after
processing the request req, and stores all the
regular expressions rgx that the certicate log is
associated to. dgid is the digest of an ordered
data structure storing a set of elements of the form
(h(id); h(cert; dga; dgrv)). It represents all domains
associated to rgx. id is an instance of rgx and
is the subject of master certicate cert. dga and
dgrv are digests of two ordered data structures
each of which respectively stores a set of active
and revoked TLS certicates. In addition, data
in the structure represented by dgrgx and dgid are
ordered by rgx and h(id), respectively; data in the
structure represented by dga and dgrv are ordered
by the subject of TLS certicates.
Note that requests upadd(h(id); h) and updel(h(id); h)
are made according to the mapping log. Even
though these modications are not requested by domain
owners, it is important to record them in the certicate
log to ensure the transparency of the log maintainer's
behaviour. Request upadd(h(id); h) states that the
certicate log maintainer is authorised to manage
certicates for the domain name id from now on, and
the current status of certicates for id is represented by
h, where h = h(cert; dga; dgrv) for some certicate cert
and some digest dga and dgrv representing the active
and revoked certicates of id. h is the value obtained
from the certicate log that is previously authorised to
manage certicates for domain id. Similarly, request
updel(h(id); h) indicates that the certicate log cannot
manage certicates for domain id any more according
to the request in the mapping log.
FIGURE 2: A gure representation of the format of
each record in the certicate log.
3.4. Synchronising the mapping log and certi-
cate logs
The mapping log periodically (e.g. every day) publishes
a signature signsk(t; dg;N), called signed Mlog time-
stamp, on a time t indicating the publishing time, and
the digest dg and size N of the mapping log. Mirrors
of the mapping log need to download this signed data,
and update their copy of the mapping log when it
is updated. A signed Mlog time-stamp is only valid
during the issue period (e.g. the day of issue). Note
that mirrors can provide the same set of proofs as
the mapping log maintainer, because the mirror has
the copy of the entire mapping log; but mirrors are
not required to be trusted, they do not need to sign
anything, and a mirror which changed the log by itself
will not be able to convince other users to accept it since
the mirror cannot forge the signed Mlog time-stamp.
When a mapping log maintainer needs to update the
mapping log, he requests all certicate log maintainers
to perform the required update, and expects to receive
the digest and size of all certicate logs once they are
updated. After the mapping log maintainer receives
these conrmations from all certicate log maintainers,
he publishes the series of update requests in the
mapping log, and appends an extra constant request
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end after them in the log to indicate that the update is
done.
Log maintainers only answer requests according to
their newly updated log if the mapping log maintainer
has published the update requests in the mapping log. If
in the log update period, some user sends requests to the
mapping log maintainer or certicate log maintainers,
then they give answers to the user according to their
log before the update started.
We say that the mapping log and certicate logs are
synchronised, if certicate logs have completed the log
update according to the request in the mapping log.
Note that a mis-behaving certicate log maintainer (e.g.
one recorded fake certicates in his log, or did not
correctly update his log according to the request of the
mapping log) can be terminated by the mapping log
maintainer by putting the certicate log maintainer's
identity into the blacklist, which is organised as an
ordered data structure represented by dgbl (as presented
in 3.2).
4. DISTRIBUTED TRANSPARENT KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE
Distributed transparent key infrastructure (DTKI) con-
tains three main phases, namely certicate publication,
certicate verication, and log verication. In the cer-
ticate publication phase, domain owners can upload
new certicates and revoke existing certicates in the
certicate log they are assigned to; in the certicate
verication phase, one can verify the validity of a cer-
ticate; and in the log verication phase, one can verify
whether a log behaves correctly.
We present DTKI using the scenario that a TLS user
Alice wants to securely communicate with a domain
owner Bob who maintains the domain example:com.
4.1. Certicate insertion and revocation
To publish or revoke certicates in the certicate log,
the domain owner Bob needs to know which certicate
log is currently authorised to record certicates for his
domain. This can be done by communicating with a
mirror of the mapping log. We detail the protocol for
requesting the mapping for Bob's domain.
4.1.1. Request mappings
Upon receiving the request, the mirror locates the
certicate of the authorised CLM, and generates the
proofs that
a) the CLM is authorised for the domain; and
b) the certicate is the current valid certicate for the
CLM.
Loosely speaking, proof a) is the proof that the
mapping from regular expression rgx to identity id is
present in the digest dgr (as presented in the mapping
log structure), such that example:com is an instance
of rgx, and id is the identity of the CLM; proof b) is
the proof that the certicate with subject id is present
in dgs; additionally, a proof that both dgs and dgr are
present in the latest record of the mapping log is needed.
All proofs should be linked to the latest digest signed
by the MLM. If Bob has previously observed a version
of the mlog, then a proof that the current mlog is an
extension of the version that Bob observed will also be
provided.
Bob accepts the response if all proofs are valid. He
then stores the veried data in his cache for future
connection until the signed digest is expired.
In more detail, after a mirror receives a request
from Bob, the mirror obtains the data of the latest
element of its copy of the mapping log, denoted h =
h(req; t; dgs; dgbl; dgr; dgi), and generates the proof of
its presence in the digest (denoted dgmlog) of its log
of size N . Then, it generates the proof of presence
of the element (cert; signsk(n; dg; t)) in the digest dg
s
for some signsk(n; dg; t), proving that the certicate
log maintainer whose cert belongs to is still active.
Moreover, it generates the proof of presence of some
element (rgx; id) in the digest dgr where id is the
subject of cert and example:com is an instance of the
regular expression rgx, proving that id is authorised to
store the certicates of example:com. The mirror then
sends to Bob the hash h, the signature signsk(n; dg; t),
the regular expression rgx, the three generated proofs
of presence, and the latest signed Mlog time-stamp
containing the time tmlog, and digest dgmlog and size
Nmlog of the mapping log.
Bob rst veries the received signed Mlog time-stamp
with the public key of the mapping log maintainer
embedded in the browser, and veries whether tMlog is
valid or not. Then Bob checks that example:com is an
instance of rgx, and veries the three dierent proofs of
presence. If all checks hold, then Bob sends the signed
Mlog time-stamp containing (t0Mlog; dg
0
mlog; N
0
mlog) that
he stored during a previous connection, and expects
to receive a proof of extension of (dg0mlog; N
0
mlog) into
(dgmlog; Nmlog). If the received proof of extension is
valid, then Bob stores the current signed Mlog time-
stamp, and believes that the certicate log with identity
id, certicate cert, and size that should be no smaller
than n, is currently authorised for managing certicates
for his domain.
4.1.2. Insert and revoke certicates
The rst time Bob wants to publish a certicate for his
domain, he needs to generate a pair of master signing
key, denoted skm, and verication key. The latter
is sent to a certicate authority, which veries Bob's
identity and issues a master certicate certm for Bob.
After Bob receives his master certicate, he checks the
correctness of the information in the certicate. The
TLS certicate can be obtained in the same way.
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To publish the master certicate, Bob signs the
certicate together with the current time t by using
the master signing key skm, and sends it together with
the request AddReq to the authorised certicate log
maintainer whose signing key is denoted skclog. The
certicate log maintainer checks whether there exists
a valid master certicate for example:com; if there is
one, then the log maintainer aborts the conversation.
Otherwise, the log maintainer veries the validity of
time t and the signature.
If they are all valid, the log maintainer updates the
log, generates the proof of presence that the master
certicate for Bob is included in the log, and sends the
signed proof and the updated digest of the log back
to Bob. If the signature and the proof are valid, and
the size of the log is no smaller than what the mirror
says, then Bob accepts and stores the response as an
evidence of successful certicate publication. If Bob has
previously observed a version of the clog, then a proof
that the current clog is an extension of the version that
Bob observed is also required.
Figure 3 presents the detailed process to publish
the master certicate certm. After a log maintainer
receives and veries the request from Bob, the
log maintainer updates the log, generates the proof
of presence of (h(id); h(certm; dg
a; dgrv)) in dgid,
(rgx; dgid) in dgrgx, and h(reg(signskm(certm; t; `reg'));
Nmlog; dg
rgx) is the last element in the data structure
represented by dgclog, where id is the subject of certm
and an instance of rgx; reg(signskm(certm; t; `reg'))
is the register request to adding certm into the
certicate log with digest dgclog at time t. The log
maintainer then issues a signature on (dgclog; N; h),
where N is the size of the certicate log, and h =
h((rgx; dgid); dgrgx; P ), where P is the sequence of the
generated proofs, and sends the signature 2 together
with (dgclog; N; rgx; dg
id; dgrgx; dga; dgrv; P ) to Bob. If
the signature and the proof are valid, and N is no
smaller than the size n contained in the signed Mlog
time-stamp that Bob received from the mirror, then
Bob stores the signed (dgclog; N; h), sends the previous
stored (dg0clog; N
0) to the certicate log maintainer, and
expects to receive a proof of extension of (dg0clog; N
0)
into (dgclog; N). If the received proof of extension
is valid, then Bob believes that he has successfully
published the new certicate.
Note that it is important to send (dg0clog; N
0)
after receiving (dgclog; N), because otherwise the log
maintainer could learn the digest that Bob has, then
give a pair (dg00clog; N
00) of digest and size of the log
such that N 0 < N 00 < N . This may open a window to
attackers who wants to convince Bob to use a certicate
which was valid in dg00clog but revoked in dgclog.
In addition, if Bob has run the request mapping
protocol more than once, and has obtained a digest
that is dierent from his local copy of the corresponding
certicate log, then he should ask the CLM to prove
that one of the digests is an extension of the other.
The process of adding a TLS certicate is similar to
the process of adding a master certicate, but the log
maintainer needs to verify that the TLS certicate is
signed by the valid master signing key corresponding to
the master certicate in the log.
To revoke a (master or TLS) certicate, the domain
owner can perform a process similar to the process
of adding a new certicate. For a revocation request
with signskm(cert; t), the log maintainer needs to check
that signskm(cert; t
0) is already in the log and t > t0.
This ensures that the same master key is used for the
revocation.
4.2. Certicate verication
FIGURE 3: The protocol presenting how domain owner
Bob communicates with certicate log (clog) maintainer
to publish a master certicate certm.
When Alice wants to securely communicate with
example:com, she sends the connection request to Bob,
and expects to receive a master certicate certm and
a signed TLS certicate signskm(cert; t) from him. To
verify the received certicates, Alice checks whether
the certicates are expired. If both of them are
still in the validity time period, Alice requests (as
described in 4.1.1) the corresponding mapping from
a mirror to nd out the authorised certicate log
for example:com, and communicates with the (mirror
of) authorised certicate log maintainer to verify the
received certicate.
Note that this verication requests extra communi-
cation round trips, but it gives a higher security guar-
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antee. An alternative way is that Bob provides both
certicates and proofs, and Alice veries the received
proofs directly.
Figure 4 presents the detailed process of verifying
a certicate. After Alice learns the identity of the
authorised certicate log, she sends the verication
request V erifReq with her local time tA and the
received certicate to the certicate log maintainer.
The time tA is used to prevent replay attacks, and
will later be used for accountability. The certicate log
maintainer checks whether tA is in an acceptable time
range (e.g. tA is in the same day as his local time).
If it is, then he locates the corresponding (rgx; dgid)
in dgrgx in the latest record of his log such that
example:com is an instance of regular expression rgx,
locates (h(id); h(certm; dg
a; dgrv)) in dgid and cert in
dga, then generates the proof of presence of cert in dga,
(h(id); h(certm; dg
a; dgrv)) in dgid, (rgx; dgid) in dgrgx,
and h(req;Nmlog; dg
rgx) is the latest record in the digest
dgclog of the log with size N . Then, the certicate log
maintainer signs (dgclog; N; tA; h), where h = h(m) such
that m = (dga; dgrv; rgx; dgid; req;Nmlog; dg
rgx; P ),
and P is the set of proofs, and sends (dgclog; N; ) to
Alice.
Alice should verify that Nmlog is the same as her local
copy of the size of mapping log. If the received Nmlog is
greater than the copy, then it means that the mapping
log is changed (it rarely happens) and Alice should
run the request mapping protocol again. If Nmlog
is smaller, then it means the CLM has misbehaved.
Alice then veries the signature and proofs, and sends
the previously stored dg0clog with the size N
0 to the
log maintainer, and expects to receive the proof of
extension of (dg0clog; N
0) into (dgclog; N). If they are
all valid, then Alice replaces the corresponding cache
by the signed (dgclog; N; tA; h) and believes that the
certicate is an authentic one.
In order to preserve privacy of Alice's browsing
history, instead of asking Alice to query all proofs from
the log maintainer, Alice can send the request to Bob
who will redirect the request to the log maintainer, and
redirect the received proofs from the log maintainer to
Alice.
With DTKI, Alice is able to verify whether Bob's
domain has a certicate by querying the proof
of absence of certicates for example:com in the
corresponding certicate log. This is useful to
prevent TLS stripping attacks, where an attacker can
maliciously convert an HTTPS connection into an
HTTP connection.
4.3. Log verication
Users of the system need to verify that the mapping log
maintainer and certicate log maintainers did update
their log correctly according to the requests they have
received, and certicate log maintainers did follow the
latest mappings specied in the mapping log.
FIGURE 4: The protocol for verifying a certicate with
the corresponding certicate log maintainer.
These checks can be easily done by a trusted monitor.
However, since we aim to provide a TTP-free system,
DTKI uses a crowdsourcing-like method, based on
random checking, to monitor the correctness of the
public log. The basic idea of random checking is that
each user randomly selects a record in the log, and
veries whether the request and data in this record
have been correctly managed. If all records are veried,
the entire log is veried. Users only need to run the
random checking periodically (e.g. once a day). The full
version (with formalisation) of random checking can be
found in our technical report. We give a avour here by
providing an example. Example 1 presents the random
checking process to verify the correct behaviour of the
mapping log.
Example 1. Suppose verier has randomly selected
the kth record of the mapping log, and the record
has the form h(add(rgx; id); tk; dg
s
k; dg
bl
k ; dg
r
k; dg
i
k). The
verier must check that all digests in this record are
updated from the (k   1)th record by adding a new
mapping (rgx; id) in the mapping log at time tk.
Let the label of the (k   1)th record be
h(reqk 1; tk 1; dgsk 1; dg
bl
k 1; dg
r
k 1; dg
i
k 1), then to ver-
ify the correctness of this record, the verier should run
the following process:
 verify that dgsk = dgsk 1 and dgblk = dgblk 1; and
 verify that dgrk is the result of adding (rgx; id) into
dgrk 1 by using VerifPoAddO, and id is an instance
of rgx; and
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 verify that (id; dgirgxk ) is the result of replacing
(id; dgirgxk 1 ) in dg
i
k 1 by (id; dg
irgx
k ) by using
VerifPoMO; and
 verify that dgirgxk is the result of adding rgx into
dgirgxk 1 by using VerifPoAddO.
Note that all proofs required in the above are given by
the log maintainer. If the above tests succeed, then the
mapping log maintainer has behaved correctly for this
record.
4.4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we measure the cost of dierent
protocols in DTKI.
Assumptions We assume that the size of a certicate
log is 108 (the total number of registered domain names
currently is 2:71  108 [38], though only a fraction of
them have certicates). In addition, we assume that
the number of stored regular expressions, the number
of certicate logs, and the size of the mapping log are
1000 each. (In fact, if we assume a dierent number
or size (e.g. 100 or 10000) for them, it makes almost
no dierence to the conclusion). Moreover, in the
certicate log, we assume that the size of the set of
data represented by dgrgx is 10, by dgid is 105, by dga
is 10, and by dgrv is 100. These assumptions are based
on the fact that dgrgx represents the set of regular
expressions maintained by a certicate log; the dgid
represents the set of domains which is an instance of a
regular expression; and dga and dgrv represent the set of
currently valid certicates and the revoked certicates,
respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the size of a
certicate is 1.5 KB, the size of a signature is 256 bytes,
the length of a regular expression and an identity is 20
bytes each, and the size of a digest is 32 bytes.
Space Based on these assumptions, the approximate
size of the transmitted data in the protocol for
publishing a certicate is 4 KB, for requesting a
mapping is 3 KB, and for verifying a certicate is
5 KB. Since the protocols for publishing a certicate
and requesting a mapping are run occasionally, we
mainly focus on the cost of the protocol for verifying
a certicate, which is required to be run between a log
server and a web browser in each secure connection.
By using Wireshark, we5 measure that the size of
data for establishing an HTTPS protocol to log-in to
the internet bank of HSBC, Bank of America, and
Citibank are 647.1 KB, 419.9 KB, and 697.5 KB,
respectively. If we consider the average size (588 KB)
of data for these three HTTPS connections, and the
average size (6 KB) of data for their corresponding
TLS establishment connections, we have that in each
connection, DTKI incurs 83% overhead on the cost of
5We use a MacBook Air 1.8 GHz Intel Core i5, 8 GB 1600
MHz DDR3.
the TLS protocol. However, since the total overhead
of an HTTPS connection is around 588 KB, so the
cost of DTKI only adds 0.9% overhead to each HTTPS
connection, which we consider acceptable.
Time Our implementation uses a SHA-256 hash value
as the digest of a log and a 2048 bit RSA signature
scheme. The time to compute a hash6 is  0:01
millisecond (ms) per 1KB of input, and the time to
verify a 2048 bit RSA signature is 0.48 ms. The
approximate verication time on the user side needed
in the protocol for verifying certicates is 0.5 ms.
Hence, on the user side, the computational cost on
the protocol for verifying certicates incurs 83% on the
size of data for establishing a TLS protocol, and 0.9%
on the size of data for establishing an HTTPS protocol;
the verication time on the protocol for verifying
certicates is 1.25 % of the time for establishing a TLS
session (which is approximately 40 ms measured with
Wireshark on the TLS connection to HSBC bank).
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We consider an adversary who can compromise the
private key of all infrastructure servers in DTKI. In
other words, the adversary can collude with all log
servers and certicate authorities to launch attacks.
Main result Our security analysis shows that
 if the distributed random checking has veried
all required tests, and domain owners have
successfully veried their initial master certicates,
then DTKI can prevent attacks from the adversary;
and
 if the distributed random checking has not
completed all required tests, or domain owners
have not successfully veried their initial master
certicates, then an adversary can launch attacks,
but the attacks will be detected afterwards.
We provide all source codes and les required to
understand and reproduce our security analysis at [39].
In particular, these include the complete DTKI models
and the veried proofs.
5.1. Formal analysis
We analyse the main security properties of the
DTKI protocol using the Tamarin prover [30]. The
Tamarin prover is a symbolic analysis tool that can
prove properties of security protocols for an unbounded
number of instances and supports reasoning about
protocols with mutable global state, which makes it
suitable for our log-based protocol. Protocols are
specied using multiset rewriting rules, and properties
are expressed in a guarded fragment of rst order logic
that allows quantication over timepoints.
6SHA-256 on 64 byte size block.
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Tamarin is capable of automatic verication in many
cases, and it also supports interactive verication by
manual traversal of the proof tree. If the tool terminates
without nding a proof, it returns a counter-example.
Counter-examples are given as so-called dependency
graphs, which are partially ordered sets of rule instances
that represent a set of executions that violate the
property. Counter-examples can be used to rene
the model, and give feedback to the implementer and
designer.
Modeling aspects We used several abstractions
during modeling. We model our log as lists, similar to
the abstraction used in [29, 40]. We also assume that
the random checking is veried.
We model the protocol roles D (domain server),
M (mapping log maintainer), C (certicate log
maintainer), and CA (certicate authority) by a set
of rewrite rules. Each rewrite rule typically models
receiving a message, taking an appropriate action, and
sending a response message. Our modeling approach
is similar to the one used in most Tamarin models.
Our modeling of the roles directly corresponds to
the protocol descriptions in the previous sections.
Tamarin provides built-in support for a Dolev-Yao
style network attacker, i.e., one who is in full control of
the network. We additionally specify rules that enable
the attacker to compromise service providers, namely
the mapping log maintainer, certicate log maintainers
and CAs, learn their secrets, and modify public logs.
Our nal DTKI model (available from [39]) consists
of 959 lines for the base model and ve main property
specications, examples of which we will give below.
Proof goals We state several proof goals for our
model, exactly as specied in Tamarin's syntax.
Since Tamarin's property specication language is
a fragment of rst-order logic, it contains logical
connectives (|, &, ==>, not, ...) and quantiers (All,
Ex). In Tamarin, proof goals are marked as lemma.
The #-prex is used to denote timepoints, and \E @
#i" expresses that the event E occurs at timepoint i.
The rst goal is a check for executability that ensures
that our model allows for the successful transmission of
a message. It is encoded in the following way.
lemma protocol_correctness:
exists-trace
" /* It is possible that */
Ex D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* without the adversary compromising any party. */
& not (Ex #i2 CA ltkCA.
Compromise_CA(CA,ltkCA) @ #i2)
& not (Ex #i3 C ltkC.
Compromise_CLM(C,ltkC) @ #i3)
& not (Ex #i4 M ltkM.
Compromise_MLM(M,ltkM) @ #i4)
"
The property holds if the Tamarin model exhibits
a behaviour in which a domain server received a
message without the attacker compromising any service
providers. This property mainly serves as a sanity
check on the model. If it did not hold, it would
mean our model does not model the normal (honest)
message ow, which could indicate a aw in the model.
Tamarin automatically proves this property in several
minutes and generates the expected trace in the form
of a graphical representation of the rule instantiations
and the message ow.
We additionally proved several other sanity-checking
properties to minimize the risk of modeling errors.
The second example goal is a secrecy property with
respect to a classical attacker, and expresses that when
no service provider is compromised, the attacker cannot
learn the message exchanged between a user and a
domain server. Note that K(m) is a special event that
denotes that the attacker knows m at this time.
lemma message_secrecy_no_compromised_party:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and no party has been compromised */
& not (Ex #i2 CA ltkCA.
Compromise_CA(CA,ltkCA) @ #i2)
& not (Ex #i3 C ltkC.
Compromise_CLM(C,ltkC) @ #i3)
& not (Ex #i4 M ltkM.
Compromise_MLM(M,ltkM) @ #i4)
)
==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not (Ex #i5. K(m) @ #i5)
)
"
Tamarin proves this property automatically (in 575
steps).
The above result implies that if a domain server D,
whose domain name is Did such that Did is an instance
of regular expression rgx, receives a message that was
sent by a user, and the attacker did not compromise
server providers, then the attacker will not learn the
message.
The next two properties encode the unique security
guarantees provided by our protocol, in the case that
even all service providers are compromised.
The rst main property we prove is that when all
service providers (i.e. CAs, the MLM, and CLMs) are
compromised, and the domain owner has successfully
veried his master certicate in the log, then the
attacker cannot learn the message exchanged between
a user and a domain owner. It is proven automatically
by Tamarin in 5369 steps.
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lemma message_secrecy_compromise_all_domain_verified_master_cert:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and at an earlier time, the domain server has verified his
master certificate */
& Ex #i2.
VerifiedMasterCert(D, Did, rgx, ltpkD) @ #i2
& #i2 < #i1
)
==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not (Ex #i3. K(m) @ #i3)
)
"
The property states that if a domain server D
receives a message that was sent by a user, and at an
earlier time, the domain server has veried his master
certicate, then even if the attacker can compromise all
server providers, the attacker cannot learn the message.
The nal property states that when all service
providers can be compromised, and a domain owner has
not veried his/her master certicate, and the attacker
learns the message exchanged between a user and the
domain owner, then afterwards the domain owner can
detect this attack by checking the log. It is also veried
by Tamarin within a few minutes.
lemma detect_bad_records_in_the_log_when_master_cert_not_verified:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD flag stpkD #i1 #i2 #i3.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and the adversary knows m */
& K(m) @ #i2
/* and we afterwards check the log */
& CheckedLog(D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, flag, stpkD) @ #i3
& #i1 < #i3)
==>
( /* then we can detect a fake record in the log */
(flag = 'bad')
)
"
6. COMPARISON
As mentioned previously, DTKI builds upon a wealth
of ideas from SK [23], CT [26], CIRT [28], and AKI [27].
Figure 5 shows the dimensions along which DTKI aims
to improve on those systems.
Compared with CT, DTKI supports revocation by
enabling log providers to oer proofs of absence and
currency of certicates. In CT, there is no mechanism
for revocation. CT has proposed additional data
structures to hold revoked certicates, and those
data structures support proofs of their contents [41].
However, there is no mechanism to ensure that the data
structures are maintained correctly in time.
Compared to CIRT, DTKI extends the log structure
of CIRT to make it suitable for multiple log maintainers,
and provides a stronger security guarantee as it prevents
attacks rather than merely detecting them. In addition,
the presence of the mapping log maintainer and multiple
certicate log maintainers create some extra monitoring
work. DTKI solves it by using a detailed crowd-sourcing
verication system to distribute the monitoring work to
all users' browsers.
Compared to AKI and ARPKI, in DTKI the log
providers can give proof that the log is maintained
append-only from one step to the next. The data
structure in A(RP)KI does not allow this, and therefore
they cannot give a veriable guarantee to the clients
that no data is removed from the log.
DTKI improves the support that CT and A(RP)KI
have for multiple log providers. In CT and AKI, domain
owners wishing to check if there exists a log provider
that has registered a certicate for him has to check
all the log providers, and therefore the full set of log
providers has to be xed and well-known. This prevents
new log providers being exibly created, creating an
oligopoly. In contrast, DTKI requires the browsers only
to have the MLM public key built-in, minimising the
oligopoly element.
In DTKI, trusted monitors are optional, as it uses
crowd-sourced verication. More precisely, a trusted
monitor's verication work can be done probabilistically
in small pieces by users' browsers.
Unlike the mentioned previous work, DTKI allows
the possibility that all service providers (i.e. the
MLM, CLMs, and mirrors) to collude together, and
can still prevent attacks. In contrast, SK and CT can
only detect attacks, and to prevent attacks, A(RP)KI
requires that not all service providers collude together.
Similar to A(RP)KI, DTKI also assumes that the
domain is initially registered by an honest party to
prevent attacks, otherwise A(RP)KI and DTKI can
only detect attacks.
7. DISCUSSION
Responding to incorrect proofs How should the
browser (and the user) respond if a received proof (e.g.,
a proof of presence in the log) is incorrect? Such
situations should be handled in the background by the
software in the browser that veries proofs, and be
sent to domain owners for further investigation. The
browser can also present errors to the user in the same
way as the current state of the art. So, the user
interface will remain the same. For example, a user
might be shown two options, i.e. either to continue
anyway, or not to trust the certicate and abort this
connection. Another possible way is to hard fail if the
verication has not been successful, as suggested by
Google certicate transparency. However, this might
be an obstacle for deploying DTKI in early stages.
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SK [23] CT [26] AKI [27] ARPKI [29] DTKI
Terminology
Log provider Time-line
server
Log Integrity log
server (ILS)
Integrity log
server (ILS)
Certicate/Mapping
log maintainer
(CLM, MLM)
Log extension - Log
consistency
- - Log extension
Trusted party Mirror Auditor &
monitor
Validator Validator
(optional)
-
Whether answers to queries rely
on trusted parties or are accom-
panied by a proof
Certicate-in-log query: Rely Proof Proof Proof Proof
Certicate-current-in-log query: Rely Rely Proof Proof Proof
Subject-absent-from-log query: Rely Rely Proof Proof Proof
Log extension query: Rely Proof Rely Rely Proof
Non-necessity of trusted monitors
The role of trusted monitors can be
distributed to browsers
No No No+ No+ Yes
Trust assumptions
Not all service providers collude
together
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Domain is initially registered by an
honest party
No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
Security guarantee
Attacks detection or prevention Detection Detection Prevention Prevention Prevention
Oligopoly issues
Log providers required to be built
into browser (oligopoly)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Only MLM
Monitors required to be built into
browser (oligopoly and trust
non-agility)
Yes No Yes Yesy No
+ The system limits the trust in each server by letting them to monitor each other's behaviour.
* Without the assumption, the security guarantee is detection rather than prevention.
y The trusted party is optional, if there is a trusted party, then the trusted party is required to be built into browser.
FIGURE 5: Comparison of log-based approaches to certicate management. Terminology helps compare the
terminology used in the papers. How queries rely on trusted parties shows whether responses to browser
queries come with proof of correctness or rely on the honesty of trusted parties. Necessity of trusted parties
shows whether the TP role can be performed by browsers. Trust assumptions shows the assumption for the
claimed security guarantee. Oligopoly issues shows the entities that browsers need to know about.
Coverage of random checking As mentioned
previously, several aspects of the logs are veried by
user's browsers performing randomly-chosen checks.
The number of things to be checked depends on the
size of the mapping log and certicate logs. The size
of the mapping log mainly depends on the number
of certicate logs and the mapping from regular
expressions to certicate logs; and the size of certicate
logs mainly depends on the number of domain servers
that have a TLS certicate. Currently, there are
2:71  108 domains [38] (though not every domain has
a certicate), and 3  109 internet users [42]. The
probability of a given domain not being checked on a
given day (or week) is (1  12:71108 )310
9  1:5610 5
(resp. ((1  12:71108 )310
9
)7  2:2510 34). Thus, the
expected number of unchecked domains per day (resp.
per week) is 4:23 103 (resp. 6:10 10 26).
Accountability of mis-behaving parties The
main goal of new certicate management schemes such
as CT, CIRT, AKI, ARPKI and DTKI is to address
the problem of mis-issued certicates, and to make the
mis-behaving (trusted) parties accountable.
In DTKI, a domain owner can readily check for rogue
certicates for his domain. First, he queries a mirror
of the mapping log maintainer to nd which certicate
log maintainers (CLM) are allowed to log certicates
for the domain (section 4). Then he examines the
certicates for his domain that have been recorded
by those CLMs. The responses he obtains from the
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mirror and the CLMs are accompanied by proofs. If he
detects a mis-issued certicate, he requests revocation
in the CLM. If that is refused, he can complain
to the top-level domain, who in turn can request
the MLM to change the CLM for his domain (after
that, the oending CLM will no longer be consulted
by browsers). This request should not be refused
because the MLM is governed by an international panel.
The intervening step, of complaining to the top-level
domain, reects the way domain names are actually
managed in practice. Dierent top-level domains have
dierent terms and conditions, and domain owners take
them into account when purchasing domain names. In
DTKI, log maintainers are held accountable because
they sign and time-stamp their outputs. If a certicate
log maintainer issues an inconsistent digest, this fact
will be detected and the log maintainer can be blamed
and blacklisted. If the mapping log misbehaved, then
its governing panel must meet and resolve the situation.
In certicate transparency, this process is not as
smooth. Firstly, the domain owner doesn't get proof
that the list of issued certicates is complete; he needs
to rely on monitors and auditors. Next, the process
for raising complaints with log maintainers who refuse
revocation requests is less clear (indeed, the RFC [26]
says that the question of what domain owners should
do if they see an incorrect log entry is beyond scope of
their document). In CT, a domain owner has no ability
to dissociate himself from a log maintainer and use a
dierent one.
AKI addresses this problem by saying that a log
maintainer that refuses to unregister an entry will
eventually lose credibility through a process managed
by validators, and will be subsequently ignored. The
details of this credibility management are not very clear,
but it does not seem to oer an easy way for domain
owners to control which log maintainers are relied on
for their domain.
Master certicate concerns One concern is that a
CA might publish fake master certicates for domains
that the CA doesn't own and are not yet registered.
However, this problem is not likely to occur: CAs
are businesses, they cannot aord the bad press from
negative public opinion and they cannot aord the loss
of reputation. Hence, they will only want to launch
attacks that would not be caught. (Such an adversary
model has been described by Franklin and Yung [43],
Canetti and Ostrovsky [44], Hazay and Lindell [45], and
Ryan [28]). In DTKI, if a CA attempts to publish a
fake master certicate for some domain, it will have to
leave evidence of its misbehaviour in the log, and the
misbehaviour will eventually be detected by the genuine
domain owner.
Another concern is the assumption that the domain
owners can securely handle their master keys. In
practice, the domain owners might have problems
looking after their master keys due to lack of awareness
of good practices. This problem arises in any web PKI:
it is assumed that domain owners can securely handle
their TLS keys. Our system adds one more key (the
master key) to that requirement. A possible practical
solution for domain owners is to use a trustworthy
service to handle TLS keys (and the master key); the
details are beyond the scope of the paper.
Avoidance of oligopoly As we mentioned in the
introduction, the predecessors (SK, CT, CIRT, AKI,
ARPKI) of DTKI do not solve a foundational issue,
namely oligopoly. These proposals require that all
browser vendors agree on a xed list of log maintainers
and/or validators, and build it into their browsers. This
means there will be a large barrier to create a new log
maintainer.
CT has some support for multiple logs, but it doesn't
have any method to allocate dierent domains to
dierent logs. In CT, when a domain owner wants
to check whether mis-issued certicates are recorded in
logs, he needs to contact all existing logs, and download
all certicates in each of the logs, because there is no
way to prove to the domain owner that no certicates
for his domain is in the log, or to prove that the log
maintainer has showed all certicates in the log for
his domain to him. Thus, to be able to detect fake
certicates, CT has to keep a very small number of
log maintainers. This prevents new log providers being
exibly created, creating an oligopoly.
In contrast to its predecessors, DTKI does not have
a xed set of certicate log maintainers (CLMs) to
manage certicates for domain owners, and it allows
operations of adding or removing a certicate log
maintainer by updating the mapping log. In DTKI, the
public log of the MLM is the only thing that browsers
need to know.
The MLM may be thought to represent a monopoly;
to the extent that it does, it is likely to be a much weaker
monopoly than the oligopoly of CAs or log maintainers.
CAs and log maintainers oer commercial services and
compete with each other, by oering dierent levels of
service at dierent price points in dierent markets.
The MLM should not oer any commercial services;
it should perform a purely administrative role, and
is not required to be trusted because it behaves fully
transparently and does not manage any certicates for
web domains. In addition, the MLM is expected to
be operated by an international panel with a lot of
members.
In practice, we expect ICANN to be the MLM, as
it is responsible for coordinating name-spaces of the
Internet, and is governed by a Governmental Advisory
Committee containing representatives from 111 states.
However, there might be concerns here, including the
concern that ICANN might not be interested in being
the MLM, due to the fact that the service won't
generate any revenue. Our solution does not address
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political issues around making decisions of whether to
add or remove some CLMs or not.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Sovereign keys (SK), certicate transparency (CT), ac-
countable key infrastructure (AKI), certicate issuance
and revocation transparency (CIRT), and attack re-
silient PKI (ARPKI) are recent proposals to make pub-
lic key certicate authorities more transparent and ver-
iable, by using public logs. CT is currently being im-
plemented in servers and browsers. Google is build-
ing a certicate transparency log containing all the cur-
rent known certicates, and is integrating verication
of proofs from the log into the Chrome web browser.
Unfortunately, as it currently stands, CT risks
creating an oligopoly of log maintainers (as discussed
in section 7), of which Google itself will be a principal
one. Therefore, adoption of CT risks investing more
power about the way the internet is run in a company
that arguably already has too much power.
In this paper we proposed DTKI { a transparent
public key validation system using an improved
construction of public logs. DTKI can prevent
attacks based on mis-issued certicates, and minimises
undesirable oligopoly situations by using the mapping
log. In addition, we formalised the public log structure
and its implementation; such formalisation work was
missing in the previous systems (i.e. SK, CT, A(RP)KI,
and CIRT). Since devising new security protocols is
notoriously error-prone, we provide a formalisation of
DTKI, and formally proved its security properties by
using Tamarin prover.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF DATA STRUC-
TURES
This section shows the implementation of the chrono-
logical data structure and ordered data structure. We
give some examples to show how the proofs could be
done. Full details can be found in our technical report.
We consider a secure hash function (e.g. SHA256), de-
noted h.
Chronological data structure
The chronological data structure is implemented based
on Merkle tree structure that we call ChronTree.
A ChronTree T is a binary tree whose nodes are
labelled by bitstrings such that:
 every non-leaf node in T has two children, and is
labelled with h(t`; tr) where t` (resp. tr) is the label
of its left child (resp. right child); and
 the subtree rooted by the left child of a node is
perfect, and its height is greater than or equal to
the height of the subtree rooted by the right child.
Here, a subtree is \perfect" if its every non-leaf node
has two children and all its leaves have the same depth.
Note that a ChronTree is a not necessarily a balanced
tree. The two trees in Figure .1 are examples of
ChronTrees where the data stored are the bitstrings
denoted d1; : : : ; d6.
FIGURE .1: Example of two ChronTrees, Ta and Tb.
Given a ChronTree T with k leaves, we denote by
S(T ) = [d1; : : : ; dk] the sequence of bitstrings stored in
T . Note that a ChronTree is completely dened by the
sequence of data stored in the leaves. Moreover, we say
that the size of a ChronTree is the number its leaves.
Given a bitstring d and a ChronTree T , the proof of
presence of d in T exists if there is a leaf n1 in T labelled
by d; and is dened as (w; [b1; : : : ; bk]) such that:
 w is the position in f`; rg of n1 (that is, the
sequence of left or right choices which lead from
the root to n1), and jwj = k; and
The Computer Journal, Vol. ??, No. ??, ????
18 J. Yu, V. Cheval, and M. Ryan
FIGURE .2: An example of a LexTree Tc, where hi =
h(di; null; null) for all i = f1; 3; 5; 7; 9; 11g
 if n1; : : : ; nk+1 is the path from n1 to the root, then
for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, bi is the label of the sibling
node of ni.
Intuitively, a proof of presence of d in T contains
the minimum amount of information necessary to
recompute the label of the root of T from the leaf
containing d.
Example 2. Consider the ChronTree Tb of Figure .1.
The proof of presence of d3 in Tb is the tuple (w; seq)
where:
 w = `  r  `
 seq = [d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)]
Note that the size of the proof of presence is
logarithmic in the size of the tree; even if the tree grows
considerably, the size of the proof does not increase
much.
Let T and T 0 be ChronTrees of size N and
N 0, respectively, such that N 0  N , S(T ) =
[d1; : : : ; dN 0 ; : : : ; dN ], and S(T 0) = [d1; : : : ; dN 0 ] for
some bitstrings d1, : : :, dN 0 , : : :, dN . Let m be
the smallest position of the bit 1 in the binary
representation of N 0; and let (d;w) be the (m + 1)th
node in the path of the node labelled by dN 0 to the root
in T , where d is a bitstring and w 2 f`; rg indicates the
position. At last, let (w; seq0) be the proof of presence
of d in T . The proof of extension of T 0 into T is dened
as the sequence seq of bitstrings such that
 if N 0 = 2k for some k, then seq = seq0; otherwise
 seq = d :: seq0, where :: is the concatenation
operation.
Example 3. The proof of extensions of Ta
into Tb (Figure .1) is the sequence seq =
[d3; d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)].
While a proof of presence is the minimal amount of
information necessary to recompute the hash value of
a ChronTree from the leaf containing some particular
data, the proof of extension is the minimal amount of
information necessary to recompute the hash value of
ChronTree T from the hash value of a ChronTree T 0
where T is an extension of T 0. Intuitively, the proof of
extension of a ChronTree T 0 into a ChronTree T is the
proof of presence in T of the last inserted data of T 0,
i.e. dN 0 when S(T 0) = [d1; : : : ; dN 0 ]. With this proof
and the sizes of both trees, we can reconstruct the label
of the root T but also the label of the root of T 0 as
means to verify the proof of extension. Note that when
N 0 = 2k for some k, it implies that the tree T 0 is perfect
and so the label of the root of T 0 is also a label of a node
in T . Therefore, to reconstruct the label of the root of
T , we only need a fragment of the proof of presence of
dN 0 in T .
Example 4. Coming back to Example 3, consider
the bitstrings hb = h(h(h(d1; d2); h(d3; d4)); h(d5; d6))
and ha = h(h(d1; d2); d3). seq proves the extension of
ha of size 3 into hb of size 6. Figure .1 is the graphical
representation of the verication of seq given ha and
hb. In particular, (` r `; [d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)]) proves
the presence of d3 in hb and (r; [h(d1; d2)]) proves the
presence of d3 in ha.
Ordered data structure
The ordered data structure is implemented as the
combination of a binary search tree and a Merkle tree.
The idea is that we can regroup all the information
about a subject into a single node of the binary search
tree, and while being able to eciently generate and
verify the proof of presence. We consider a total order
on bitstrings denoted . This order could be the
lexicographic order in the ASCII representations but
it could be any other total order on bitstrings. The
implementation is called LexTree.
A LexTree T is a binary search tree over pairs of
bitstrings
 for all two pairs (d; h) and (d0; h0) of bitstrings in
T , (d; h) occurs in a node left of the occurrence of
(d0; h0) if and only if d  d0 lexicographically;
 for all nodes n 2 T , n is labelled with the
pair (d; h(d; h`; hr)) where d is some bistring and
(d`; h`) (resp. (dr; hr)) is the label of its left child
(resp. right child) if it exists; or the constant null
otherwise.
Note that contrary to a ChronTree, the same set
of data can be represented by dierent LexTrees
depending on how the tree is balanced. To avoid this
situation, we assume that there is a pre-agreed way for
balancing trees.
Example 5. The tree in Figure .2 is an example of
LexTree where d1  d2  : : :  d12.
Example 6. Consider the LexTree T of Figure .2.
The proof of presence of d8 in T is the tuple
(h`; hr; seqd; seqh) where:
 h` = h7 and hr = h9; and
 seqd = [d10; d6]
 seqh = [h(d12; h11; null); h(d4; h(d2; h1; h3); h5)]
Like in ChronTrees, verifying the proof of presence of
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some data d in a LexTree T consists of reconstructing
the hash value of the root of T .
Example 7. Consider the Tc of Figure .2. Consider
some data d such that d7  d  d8. The proof of
absence of d in Tc is the tuple (null; null; seqd; seqh)
where:
 seqd = [d7; d8; d10; d6]
 seqh = [h9; h(d12; h11; null); h(d4; h(d2; h1; h3); h5)]
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